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The information seeking behaviour of oil and gas industry workers in the context of 
health, safety and emergency response:  a discussion of the value of models of 
information behaviour 
 
Introduction and context 
The critical nature of health and safety in the oil and gas industry continues to dominate the 
media, as illustrated by the high profile Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2010, where a 
subsequent investigation concluded that “BP focused too much on the little details of 
personal worker safety instead of the big systemic hazards that led to the 2010 Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill”, noting in particular the “difference between worker safety and making sure 
the entire rig and well are safe” (The Guardian 2012).  Many of the concerns noted by the 
panel focused on incompatible systems and poor communications creating a barrier 
between operator and contractor. 
In 2011, a team at Aberdeen Business School conducted a research project, sponsored by 
AVEVA, which explored the role of information systems in enhancing health, safety and 
emergency (HSE) response in the oil and gas industry. This resulted in an industry report 
which was launched at simultaneous events in Aberdeen, UK and Houston, Texas (Marcella 
and Pirie 2011). Whilst the research identified interesting and useful perspectives on the 
role of information systems, or safety management systems in enhancing health and safety 
information, it also uncovered insights into the information seeking behaviour of oil and gas 
employees in the context of health and safety information. These insights form the focus of 
the present paper which seeks to consider the research findings in light of influential 
theoretical approaches to information seeking. 
 
Literature Review 
Previous research into safety management systems in the oil and gas industry has focused 
on the design and implementation of systems, their effectiveness and reliability, and the 
organisational culture necessary for such systems to have impact. There has been little 
research into information behaviour and use in the context of organisational information 
needs and the interaction between the individual and organisation through these systems. 
 
Safety Management Systems  
The oil and gas industry employs complex and multiple systems to store, retrieve, create 
and communicate information relating to health and safety. As such, Reason, Parker and 
Lawton (1998) conclude that consideration should be given to the needs and capacities of 
end users when safety management systems processes and guidance are developed.  
Comprehensible and usable information communication is particularly significant in light of 
Reason’s (1998) sentiment that a safe culture is an informed culture.  
Given the challenge of operating in a dynamic and highly competitive industry, it is 
unsurprising that Dijkhuizen and Henriquez (2011) highlight that not every accident will be 
fully investigated because of a lack of time and that, therefore, organisations across the oil 
and gas industry should share data for subsequent analysis of direct and root causes. They 
suggest that a standard classification should be used to help feed analysis back into safety 
management and to guide priority setting. Mearns et al. (2003) also present a case for 
greater cross-industry collaboration between organisations and argue that the benefits of 
sharing information outweigh any perceived threats in being open about incidents that have 
occurred. They suggest that confidential reporting is the key to understanding the role of 
human factors in accidents. Meanwhile, Groeneweg et al. (2010) believe that investigations 
should explore fully the role of information as part of incidents.  
Baram (2010) concludes that better analysis of information and wider collaboration is vital 
to improvement in health and safety performance and that the industry must create a 
trusting environment to build a positive safety culture rather than focusing on compliance. 
Understanding how individuals use and think about information in a health and safety 
context will aid the creation of a positive safety culture which encourages incident 
reporting.  
Bottani, Monica and Vignali (2009) argue that adopters of safety management systems 
exhibit higher performance levels across a variety of safety indicators, suggesting that the 
mere fact of having a system will lead to enhanced safety. To be effective, safety 
management systems require input and interaction by multiple agents. Beard and Santos-
Reyes (2003) identify two types of knowledge required to underpin effective systems: (i) 
procedures/processes/operations; and (ii) technical/human/organisational aspects. 
However, even those with automated safety management systems face challenges as a 
result of the complexity and variety of standards, organisational complexity and 
cumbersome documentation. Davidson, Provost and Baatz (2006) argue that standardising 
and simplifying processes and documentation would allow for better staff understanding of 
personal roles and responsibilities regarding health and safety.  
Commentators highlight the importance of near miss reporting to identify potential risks. 
However, there are two areas of fallibility: the person and the system (Reason 2000) where 
it is possible to seek either a systemic organisational or psychological cause of failure. 
Reason categorises failures into two types: active failures (unsafe acts carried out by people 
in direct contact with the system) and latent failures (error provoking conditions, which may 
take a long time to emerge). Both may be dependent on access to reliable information. 
Research has also been carried out into the extent to which systems can help both 
proactively to predict accidents and reactively to investigate their cause.  In 2008 Aas 
created a classification framework to form the basis of a ‘formal knowledge transfer 
system’, which can also be used to predict and prevent future accidents and analyse the 
effectiveness of risk mitigations (Aas 2008: 275). Johnsen et al. (2010) conclude that the use 
of proactive risk indicators, identified through sources such as interviews, the literature and 
Health and Safety Executive guidelines, can make organisations more resilient. However, 
there is also evidence to suggest that information may exist but not be available in a usable 
form. Brazier and Pacitti (2008) found that poor handovers have contributed to major 
accidents. The face-to-face shift handover might be enhanced by creating a structured 
logging environment, with log books and handover reports. This allows easier sharing of 
information, to improve decision making and priority setting and leaves an audit trail (see 
also Cavaye and Poutchkovsky, 2004).  
Endsley (2000: 4) explores the information dimensions of situational awareness theory, 
arguing that 'the problem with today's systems is not a lack of information, but finding what 
is needed when it is needed ... this is because there is a huge gap between the tons of data 
being produced and disseminated and people's ability to find the bits that are needed and 
process them' in support of decision making. Saracevic recognised this challenge which led 
to his theory of information consolidation (Saracevic and Wood 1981). The added dimension 
of the situational aspects of information need formulated by Endsley (2000: 4) emphasises 
the importance of systems supporting 'the operator's ability to get the needed information 
under dynamic operational constraints'.  
The ‘elements’(‘elements’ (Endsley 2000: 4) of situational awareness vary widely between 
domains  butdomains but the components can be generalised as perception, 
comprehension, projection or prediction and temporal aspects. The first stage, perception, 
which is described as fundamental, refers to the perception of cues and information. 
Comprehension is the second stage of situation awareness which involves the combination, 
interpretation, storage and retention of information to derive meaning and significance in 
relation to goals and tasks. Stage three, projection, is the ability to forecast future situations 
to allow for timely decision making. Finally the temporal aspects of situation awareness are 
considered, as how much time is available until an event occurs will influence action to be 
taken, and impact on tasks and goals. The dynamic aspect of real-world situations is 
highlighted, with the need for situation awareness to evolve as situations change and new 
information is available, and which is a fundamental ability when dealing with a critical or 
emergency incident.     
 
The Communication of Health and Safety Information 
As staff are expected to deal with a significant amount of health and safety information in 
the workplace, the capacity of end users must be considered when implementing safety 
management  systems, and information must be displayed and communicated to them in a 
way which is comprehensible and useable. Fairbairn, Pegram and Nishapati (2006) describe 
the typical ‘safety case’ as a huge document, in which information is difficult to find and 
extract and which often means little to the workforce. These documents also date quickly. 
Fairbairn, Pegram and Nishapati (2006) believe that presenting the safety case in a graphic 
and dynamic electronic format makes it easier to understand, allows information to be 
tailored to job role and responsibilities and, generally, improves communication. Similarly, 
Campbell, Duguay and Lecoindre (2010) argue that a pictographic and standardised 
representation of health and safety information is better suited to its effective 
communication to multicultural workforces. If such visualisations are realistic they can also 
enhance perceptions of safety (Frohlich, 2010). Dalzell (2004) also argues that staff must 
have access to sufficient information to do their job safely, concluding that knowledge is the 
greatest risk reducer.  
Brazier and Sedgwick (2011) argue that over-reliance on verbal communication may 
undermine safety as there are too many opportunities for miscommunication. They propose 
that communications between control rooms and senior management be improved by 
recording information electronically, a form also easy to use, update and search. Use of a 
single integrated system would also ensure that the format, structure and content of 
handovers are standardised, improving the safety culture and enabling the historical 
analysis of information. 
Johnsen et al. (2008) note that collaborative digital integrated systems improve 
communication between onshore and offshore personnel, optimising decision making; 
however, companies are cautioned to be vigilant about security risks, the potential lack of 
shared understanding and the need for staff training in system use. Other benefits of an 
integrated system identified by Kubala and Carey (2002) include greater consistency of 
implementation and a heightened capacity to provide multilingual and multicultural 
information and resources.  
It is widely acknowledged that information dissemination could be better designed to 
engage the workforce. Lopez (2012) proposes greater use of new forms of social media as 
an effective way of engaging and informing staff about the health and safety agenda.  While 
Tamarra and Macwan (2012) believe that the inclusion of a daily health and safety message 
in the footer of every e-mail sent in an organisation ensures that the health and safety 
culture permeates the workforce. Flin (2008) recommends storytelling as a good way of 
involving staff in learning about health and safety. 
 
Organisational Factors 
In terms of organisational culture and the effectiveness of safety management systems, 
Reiman and Rollenhagen (2011) believe that a sound safety culture requires a holistic 
human and system alignment; while Antonsen, Ramstad and Kongsvik (2007) conclude that 
a trusting, encouraging, participatory environment is essential, if the workforce is to make 
informed health and safety decisions. However, Reason, Carthey and Leval (2001) believe 
that what they call the ‘vulnerable system syndrome’ has three elements - blame, denial and 
pursuit of specific indicators - each of which may undermine the production of good and 
reliable intelligence. Cohan (2002) also warns of ‘information myopia’ as a common feature 
of the lead up to critical incidents, where a poor organisational culture impacts on honesty 
and information sharing. 
Choo (2009) discusses the information barriers which prevent organisations from noting and 
acting upon warning signals, including: epistemic blind spots (selective use of information, 
use of information which confirms beliefs, reinterpretation of information to meet beliefs); 
risk denial (values, norms and priorities influence the use of information so that no action is 
taken); and structural impediments (the supply and flow of information affects the 
organisation’s ability to detect, mitigate and recover from failures).  
First, in early warning, it is difficult to discern signals about a real threat from random 
noise. Second, even when signals are detected, policy makers have to weigh the costs 
and consequences of possible false alarms and misses in deciding whether to [move to] 
active warning. (Choo 2009: 1071).  
Choo also notes that information is rarely complete or conclusive and difficult decisions 
remain, reinforcing the need for an open and honest reporting culture to maximise the 
value of workforce intelligence. 
Mearns and Yule (2009) find management commitment to safety a critical factor in 
influencing levels of safety behaviour, in contrast with the widely held view that frontline 
staff need to take more responsibility for safety (Marcella and Pirie 2011). To reduce 
disparity between management and workforce perceptions of health and safety 
effectiveness, Hovden et al. (2008) recommend the involvement of safety representatives in 
gathering employee opinions and assessments.  
Digital systems are today considered essential for effective operation in offshore or any 
remote operating environment (Maher et al. 2011). Haight (2006), however, concludes that 
a balance is needed between human and system capacity to maximise a safe culture; while 
Moulton and Forrest (2005) suggest that automation can lead to ‘out-of-loop’ syndrome 
where the workforce becomes detached from the process and more experienced staff are 
discouraged from passing on tacit knowledge to those less experienced. Folb et al. (2010) 
caution that, as in other domains, the effectiveness of health and safety information 
systems is undermined by time constraints leading inevitably to the phenomenon of 
satisficing, described as “accepting less than full information as adequate” (Folb et al. 2010: 
6). 
 
Models of Information Seeking Behaviour  
As illustrated by the literature presented above, much of the research regarding health and 
safety information has focused on systems, processes and organisational context, with little 
focus on the role of the individual and their information seeking behaviour. The present 
paper attempts to place health and safety information in a theoretical context by 
considering data on information behaviour collected from a practical study, designed to 
feed back into industry practice, in terms of their relevance to models of information 
seeking behaviour.  Relating practice to theory in this way will help us to explore the 
contribution such models can make to develop an understanding of the information 
practices demonstrated in the earlier study.  
Four models of information seeking behaviour will be considered: Kuhlthau (1991); Leckie, 
Pettigrew and Sylvain (1996); Ellis and Haugan (1997) and Wilson (1999). Case (2006: 120) 
states “theories and models are simplified versions of reality, yet models typically make 
their content more concrete through a diagram of some sort…a model describes a 
relationship among concepts but is tied more closely to the real world…”. This relationship 
with the real world is a major attraction in using models to understand the information 
seeking behaviour of oil and gas employees in relation to health and safety information. This 
study was carried out with participation from health and safety managers, senior managers 
and engineers currently working in the oil and gas industry.   
Kuhlthau’s Information Search Process 
Kuhlthau (1991) sets out a general model from the user’s perspective of an Information 
Search Process which considers not only information actions and tasks, but also the 
affective dimension in the feelings and thoughts that individuals experience during this 
process. She describes her model as “the user’s constructive activity of finding meaning 
from information in order to extend his or her state of knowledge on a particular problem or 
topic” (Kuhlthau 1991: 361).  
There are six stages to the information search process; initiation (an awareness of lack of 
knowledge or understanding, recognising the need for information); selection (identification 
and selection of a general topic or approach); exploration (finding information on a general 
topic to extend individual understanding); formulation (forming a focus for the search 
through information found in exploration); collection (gathering of information related to 
the focused topic); and presentation (completing the search and preparing to present or 
otherwise use the information collected).  
 
Ellis and Haugan’s General Behavioural Model of Information Seeking Patterns 
Ellis and Haugan (1997) carried out research into the information seeking patterns of 
research workers in an oil and gas company in the context of their “general behavioural 
model [which] can be considered to be quite robust in relation to the information seeking 
patterns of scientists, engineers and social scientists in both academic and an industrial 
research environment” (1997: 402).  
Eight behaviours are identified although no sequence is given in which these behaviours 
occur. Surveying is the process of gathering an overview of literature within a new subject, 
or identifying key people in the field as potential sources of information by speaking to 
colleagues, consulting internal documents, etc. Chaining is following the connections or 
references between sources of information to identify new sources, again through literature 
or personal contacts. Monitoring involves maintaining an awareness of developments 
formally or informally. Browsing involves casually consulting primary and secondary sources. 
Distinguishing also happens between sources to identify the information best suited to the 
individual information need, whilst considering available time and the extent of the 
information need. Filtering is using specific criteria or mechanisms which ensure information 
is relevant and precise, whilst extracting is working through these sources to identify 
material of interest to the searcher. Finally ending involves checking sources for new 
information since the search was begun, and clarifying any queries or questions. 
 Leckie, Pettigrew and Sylvain’s Information Seeking Behaviour of Professionals 
Leckie, Pettigrew and Sylvain (1996) propose a general model of the information seeking 
behaviour of professionals (e.g. doctors, lawyers, engineers), recognising that each will 
encounter a variety of work related information needs and arguing that “while it is true that 
the provision of various types of service or expertise to their clients is the overarching 
activity that links all professionals, they work within specific environments that differ greatly 
in organizational structure, mission, goals and social culture.” (p. 178). There are six 
components in this general model of information seeking by professionals: 
Work roles and associated tasks – professional life is complicated and various roles are 
assumed in day-to-day work. Specific tasks are associated with each of these roles which 
influence the context of an information need. 
Characteristics of information need – roles and tasks are influenced by factors such as 
searcher demographics and the context, frequency, importance and complexity of the 
search. 
Awareness – the searcher’s level of awareness of sources and/or content influences 
information seeking behaviour, as does familiarity with sources, trustworthiness, packaging, 
cost, quality and accessibility.  
Sources – sources of information in professional contexts are varied and can include 
colleagues, librarians, handbooks, journals and personal knowledge and experience. They 
may be formal/informal, internal/external and oral/written sources.  
Outcomes – the outcomes of information seeking behaviour ideally are that the information 
need is met and the instigating task is accomplished. If not, further information seeking 
behaviour can take place to satisfy the information need.     
 
Wilson’s Global Model of Information Behaviour 
To fully understand Wilson’s 1996 global model of information behaviour, his 1981 model 
must first be explored. The 1981 model was an outline of areas associated with information 
seeking behaviour, emanating from a perceived need by an information user. To satisfy the 
need, formal or informal information sources are consulted, leading to either success or 
failure in finding relevant information. If successful, the information found will be used to 
satisfy the user’s need; if unsuccessful, then the search process will begin again (Wilson 
1981).  
Wilson later revised this model, drawing on research from fields other than information 
science, such as decision making, psychology and consumer research (Wilson 1996). The 
1996 model describes a cyclical process which begins with the person in context, followed 
by the context of the information need. An activating mechanism instigates the need for 
information, and intervening variables influence the line of information behaviour taken by 
the individual. Another activating mechanism dictates the need to find information and then 
information seeking behaviour occurs. Wilson proposes four categories of information 
seeking behaviour: passive attention, passive search, active search, and ongoing search. 
Information found is then processed and used, or deemed unsuitable to fulfil the 
information need and the information seeking process starts again.  
The Wilson model synthesises the recognition of contextual and individual factors which 
impact on the information seeking process, whilst acknowledging the significance of volition 
on the part of the searcher. 
In 2008, Wilson commented on the growing disconnection between research by 
practitioners (to improve practice) and academic research (grounded on theory), 
commenting that the “consequence of a disconnection between practice and academe is 
the danger that the division may become so complete that both sets of players simply 
ignore what is happening in the other ‘world’…some may believe that the position has 
already been reached that professional education and research are irrelevant to practice” 
(Wilson 2008: 462). Wilson suggests that action research should be applied to future 
research into information seeking behaviour to help bridge this gap. Whilst the project from 
which this paper draws its data was not designed as an action research project, the data 
gathered draws from the real life experiences of practitioners. In particular the critical 
incident case approach used in the interviews allows the researcher to explore the 
behaviour of practitioners in an information seeking activity with minimal prompting and a 
focus on what actually happened. 
 
Research Methodology 
The aim of the current paper is to explore data from commissioned research into the role of 
information systems in the management of health and safety in the oil and gas industry, to 
consider: (i) the extent to which these data can be explained by existing models of 
information behaviour; and (ii) to identify any emerging findings which add to our 
theoretical perspectives on information behaviour.  
The research project was conducted in two stages, in a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches: (i) an online survey; and (ii) in-depth interviews utilising critical incidents as a 
focus in four case study companies.  
The research team were part of Aberdeen Business School at Robert Gordon University, 
with expertise in information management and information behaviour. This influenced the 
design of the survey and, although the focus was on information systems, ensured that 
theoretical perspectives on information seeking behaviour were considered in design of the 
instruments. All survey questions and interview schedules were designed in consultation 
with the commissioning company AVEVA, to reflect industry perspectives, and each part of 
the study was piloted at an appropriate stage with industry representatives. The interview 
schedule was piloted internally amongst AVEVA personnel, which led to a diverse array of 
individuals contributing to the design of the research instrument. On reflection whilst the 
process of collaborative research design can be challenging, with industry-led research 
focusing on broad lessons and academic research focusing on what may be perceived as 
small detail, a collaborative approach was felt to be an effective exercise in ensuring the 
research instrument was well designed. In the authors’ experience the outcomes from a 
robustly designed instrument have been positive, ensuring effective output for both parties.  
The online survey was conducted between April and May 2011 using Survey Monkey (survey 
questions are provided in Appendix 1). Participants were invited to complete the online 
survey via e-mail, which was distributed to organisational industry contacts and the LinkedIn 
‘Oil and Gas Professionals’ group. Participation was also promoted via press releases. There 
were 374 responses to the online survey from operating companies, contractors, service 
companies and suppliers. Respondents tended to be health and safety managers, senior 
managers and engineers. Over 72% of participants described themselves as able to exert 
major influence on health and safety decision making and direction, indicating a relatively 
senior level of respondents. Responding companies operated worldwide, with only 29% 
focused on the UK Continental Shelf.  
In the second stage of the research, four companies were enlisted to participate in in-depth 
follow-up interviews: these were an operator, a contractor, a manufacturer and a logistics 
company (interview questions are provided in Appendix 2). Participating companies were 
identified through industry contacts, LinkedIn and from the survey. A single critical incident 
to be discussed was identified by the companies before interviewing began, and all incidents 
chosen were unexpected and unpredictable. The incidents selected were regarded as 
sufficiently substantial to have potentially caused a detrimental impact on the organisation, 
but were not of such stature as to jeopardise company anonymity. The duration of incidents 
ranged from a week to years, and interviewees were key individuals instrumental in dealing 
with the incidents and able to comment critically on the impact information behaviour had 
had on their company’s capacity to respond. 
Interviews were carried out face-to-face or via telephone and lasted between 40 minutes 
and two hours. All interviews were recorded with verbal permission by interview 
respondents. The interview schedule was long and covered lots of eventualities; therefore 
some questions were superfluous and truncated, were not needed, or further probing was 
required depending on the circumstance and receptiveness of the interviewee. The 
interviews were subsequently transcribed verbatim and recurring themes were coded by 
the research team, in an iterative process. Subsequent further analysis for the present paper 
has been informed by the models of information behaviour discussed above. 
Interviews were carried out with eleven individuals encouraging reflection on the critical 
incident identified. Interviewees held a variety of roles in relation to these, including 
investigator, supervisor, lead response, project manager, team leader, safety advisor, duty 
manager, data analyst and participant. The research team sought participation from a 
variety of organisational levels to reflect the differing perspectives within an emergency 
response team dealing with a critical incident.  
The critical incident case study technique was chosen for the interviews, as this allows a 
‘storytelling’ approach, with interview participants telling the research team about an 
incident in their own words. The critical incident technique is an approach first heralded by 
Flanagan (1954) and subsequently found valuable as part of behavioural research in relation 
to information behaviours (see, for example, Sonnenwald, Wildemuth & Harmon 2001 and 
Urquhart et al. 2003). The critical incident formed the early focus of the interview, followed 
by questions about safety information in the second half. This avoided dictating which 
topics should be discussed during the critical incident part of the interview, gave focus to 
the interview for participants, encouraged free and open discourse on a familiar topic, and 
enhanced analysis of the key themes. On reflection the research team believe this to be a 
sound approach to the research project and believe the results of this study reinforce the 
value of critical incidents as a focus for storytelling and narrative enquiry in future 
information behaviour research. It enables participants to describe in real life terms 
episodes of information behaviour where participants may have little understanding of (or 
interest in) the information domain on a more conceptual level. 
To better understand the data from the research project in the context of information 
seeking behaviour, the components of the models were categorised into three general 
themes: pre-search, searching, and information use and application.  
 
Information 
Behaviour 
Model 
Pre-search Searching Information use and application 
Kuhlthau (1991) 
Initiation, selection, 
exploration and 
formulation 
Collection Presentation 
Leckie, 
Pettigrew and 
Sylvain (1996) 
Work role and associated 
tasks, characteristics of 
information need 
Awareness and sources Outcomes 
Ellis and Haugan 
(1997) Surveying 
Chaining, monitoring, 
browsing, distinguishing 
and filtering 
Extracting and 
ending 
Wilson (1996) 
Person in context, context 
of information need and 
activating mechanism 
Intervening variables, 
activating mechanism and 
information seeking 
behaviour  
Information 
processing and 
use 
 
The discussion which follows presents the results of the commissioned research in three 
broad sections: 
(i) in terms of what the results of the research tell us about information behaviour 
in relation to systems, the company context and the individual; 
(ii) in terms of what the results of the interviews tell us about individual information 
behaviour (pre-searching, searching and information use); and 
(iii) a discussion of the applicability of the information behaviour models to the 
observed information seeking environment.  
The Systems 
Safety management systems provide the core for managing the metrics applied by 
companies to safety, with 92% of questionnaire respondents reporting their company had 
an information system to support health and safety. However, despite the widespread use 
of safety management systems throughout the responding companies, over a quarter of 
respondents felt there were difficulties in accessing information to help them operate 
safely; almost 30% of respondents felt there were deficiencies in the reporting of and 
provision of health and safety information; and over 35% were aware of instances where 
they or colleagues had not recorded information about near misses. Paradoxically, while 
respondents were confident they were sharing information with others, 24% felt that 
relevant information was not being shared with them and over 45% reported instances 
where information was not shared with other parties.  
Tools being developed to improve safety information included developing dynamic forms of 
safety communications (for example, toolbox talks, e-mails and notice boards), improving 
company handbooks, increased training, increased emphasis on competency assessment 
and strengthening safety leadership. 
All companies had incident recording and reporting systems although concerns were 
expressed about the communication of safety lessons in a comprehensible and dynamic 
manner. The methods most commonly used to provide employees with health and safety 
information were safety bulletins, safety meetings, newsletters, site walk-arounds by 
management, verbal direction, toolbox talks, seminars, company handbooks, e-mail, 
company intranets, training packages, management systems and notice boards.  
Interviewees were comfortable they had process safety information to support 
organisational metrics, and that this information was current and robust. There were issues, 
however, as to whether the correct types of information were being recorded.  
A complex array of information sources is used to carry out roles safely including: company 
intranets, intranet gateways to external resources, the UK Health and Safety Executive 
website, Institution of Occupational Safety and Health materials, competitor websites, 
customer guidelines, trade documents, government websites/documents, information 
related to external audits, information shared with companies/competitors, management 
meetings, company health and safety reports, statistical reports from external agencies, 
integrated management systems, verbal briefings from health, safety and environment 
teams, maintenance management systems, incident recording systems, accounting systems 
and verbal communication with key individuals.  
Interviewees reported that the majority of information required was available through a 
company database, although it was recognised that third party information was integrated 
on an ad-hoc basis, explaining the previously reported uncertainty around the reliability of 
some information.  
Many thought an integrated system collocating the variety of sources, systems and data, 
would be desirable, if challenging to produce. Integration would enhance consistency of 
information provision, reduce reliance on cascade procedures and ensure updated 
information is available in one location.  However some respondents noted breakdowns in 
communication channels closer to the front line, as, for example, when information is 
communicated verbally at potentially weak points such as shift handover. 
The ease with which respondents can communicate with the systems or people that could 
help respond to an incident varied. Some found internal communication to be easier than 
external; in one case all communications were mediated through a third party. Other 
agendas may come into play, as a result of concerns around liability, competitive advantage, 
market impact and reputation, and these tend to be heightened in critical incident 
situations. Some interviewees reported a reluctance to share information. Such caution may 
impede an organisation’s ability to respond to the incident in the quickest and most 
effective manner, encourage duplication of effort, result in differing conclusions being 
drawn and lead to confusion about responsibilities.  
Research participants acknowledged that information gaps existed during a critical incident, 
which were sometimes unpredictable and inevitable. It was however felt that such gaps 
placed additional pressure on staff not just at the outset of an incident but throughout its 
duration, as ill-informed early decisions affected everything that followed. This is in line with 
Endsley’s (2000: 5) theory of situation awareness, which states the perception of cues is 
fundamental as ‘the odds of forming an incorrect picture of the situation increase 
dramatically’ if cues are missed.  
While much might be done to enhance information dissemination to staff to support 
ongoing safety performance, it is particularly important that critical incident information 
handling procedures be drawn up, given the heightened importance of getting the right 
information quickly to the right people, to minimise collateral damage. All of the pressures 
of everyday information handling are exacerbated when dealing with a potentially 
catastrophic incident, yet individuals rely – arguably to an even greater extent – on sources 
that are ‘trusted’, familiar and physically accessible.  
Whilst safety management systems have improved communications across the oil and gas 
industry and its supply chain, respondents continue to report barriers to open 
communication and transparent reporting of the causes of incidents, undermining the 
potential of such shared systems to aid in the identification of performance indicators which 
robustly assess safety performance and ensure that lessons are being learned from incidents 
and near misses.  
 The Company Context 
Safety management systems are used by the oil and gas industry to monitor safety 
performance and improvements in safety, as well as to raise safety awareness generally and 
encourage a positive safety culture. Drivers include changes in regulation/legislation, 
customer demands, changes in industry perceptions, increased focus on procedural 
compliance and increased media coverage of high profile industry incidents.  Respondents 
sought to foster better personal attitudes and individual safety behaviours, as well as 
encouraging personal responsibility for safety.  
It was felt by companies involved in the research that they provided a good level of 
structured guidance and training for employees on accessing or searching for information. 
This was done through the use of staff handbooks and training programmes. There was, 
however, evidence of confusion amongst respondents around the myriad of regulatory 
standards and compliance regimes in which they operated. Equally an individual might have 
to deal with a variety of differing client expectations. Respondents noted particular 
challenges in dealing with environmental regulations.  
The industry as a whole also faces the twin challenge of an often highly experienced 
workforce, with very fixed views; in contrast to new entrants with new ideas but little real 
life experience.  This tension is felt to impact on the success of safety enhancement 
initiatives to encourage behavioural change. 
 
The Information User 
Pre-searching 
Respondents reported that the diverse workforce – in age range, experience, culture and 
literacy levels – reduced the effectiveness of training packages which tended to be designed 
for office-based staff or new employees.  
Just over half of respondents reported a need for better systems to record audit 
improvements, and over 40% of respondents reported a need to improve the quality of 
safety information available. Clearer information was required about fundamentals, such as 
what procedures should be followed if an incident occurs. Respondents felt that company 
handbooks could be improved by clearly highlighting the most reliable indicators of 
heightened risk. Respondents also reiterated the need for more user friendly health and 
safety information systems, greater pictorial representation of information, and improved 
offsite access to systems. More generally, there were calls for an overall simplification of 
documentation.  
To overcome these issues respondents felt that employees should have a more proactive 
role in determining the information which could highlight potential risks and in identifying 
the information required in the event of an emergency or when dealing with a health and 
safety incident. Although challenging, such user consultation at the design stage will 
inevitably result in better designed information systems. 
 
Searching 
Critical incidents are dynamic high pressure situations, when a variety of information is 
required from multiple sources to enhance situation awareness and make decisions quickly; 
information needs can change and develop as the incident unfolds. Delays in sourcing 
information can potentially escalate the incident but also heighten risks for others involved. 
Overall, interviewees highlighted the need for information to be readily available in one 
physical/virtual location when dealing with an incident, so the whole emergency response 
team has access to information relevant to where the incident was occurring.  
Time was identified as a significantly influential factor when dealing with an incident as 
decisions often need to be made instantaneously or conversely be made over a period of 
months, depending on the nature of the incident. It was felt where time is a critical factor 
there is a greater chance of full data not being resourced to make a decision, again aligning 
with situation awareness theory.  
The variety of types of information required when responding to a critical incident might 
include: information from people involved in the incident, the location of the incident, what 
machinery/equipment/chemicals were involved, customer/contractor/supplier information 
and policies, company data about the specific job, data recorded on machinery/equipment, 
incident statements, third party assessments of products/equipment as well as the location 
of affected equipment, where employees/contractors were located at the time of the 
incident, information about how the company wishes to proceed, information on the 
logistics of moving employees, the current state of operations and occupational health 
advice. There was also a need to verify the validity of information accessed during a critical 
incident. 
While 80% of questionnaire respondents felt the systems they used supported them in 
assessing and improving safety, more than 30% had never received training on how to 
access the information they needed to operate safely. Sources used by employees for safety 
information include team meetings, informal networks and external experts. There was also 
a tendency to surf the Internet in the hope of finding relevant and reliable information. 
When dealing with a critical incident, interviewees were guided in finding the information 
they required by: training in dealing with specific situations; seeking guidance from senior 
managers; approaching trade bodies; and generic searching on the Internet. When working 
as a team during a critical incident, employees liaised and shared information via telephone, 
e-mail, video conferencing or face to face meetings.  
The survey revealed profound barriers in terms of user access to information. Over 25% of 
respondents find it a challenge to access information they feel necessary to perform their 
roles safely. The challenges faced included: systems failure, procedures not covering specific 
circumstances, filing issues, data not existing, lack of communication infrastructure in-
country, overly complex systems, poorly indexed systems, restricted access areas in 
systems, and information overload. Over 40% also reported difficulties in knowing how to 
search for relevant safety information, which could be related to the access issues reported 
above or to deficiencies in training. This could also be explained by around 25% who felt 
unsure about what safety information they actually had access to and the circumstances in 
which it should be used. 
In all of the critical incidents, respondents reported having to consult external sources of 
information, including: third party transport agencies, vendors, the emergency services, 
customers and suppliers, environmental agencies, trade bodies, standards agencies, 
government bodies, contractors, logistics experts and offshore installations. The usefulness 
of these sources was determined by experience, industry codes and company procedures or 
driven by the nature of the incident. A number also reported relying on ‘gut instinct’. 
Some interviewees had been guided by senior management to external sources of 
information, and team and management discussions would take place concerning the 
trustworthiness of external sources, which are more likely to be subjected to some form of 
verification. Interviewees regarded internal information as more likely to have been 
previously subject to quality assurance. Others noted that they had no way of assuring 
themselves that the information they were using was fit for purpose. Where people were 
aware of uncertainty over the status of information they tended to escalate concerns about 
data reliability to senior management teams flagging its questionable status and seeking 
advice.  
It is interesting to note the high level of trust demonstrated in, and lack of verification of, 
internal information sources in light of the evidence of the survey that respondents tend to 
be aware of misreporting of data in internal systems. 
 
Information Use 
Despite awareness of gaps in the sharing of knowledge, respondents reported feeling 
pressurised and overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information, frequently duplicated or 
contradictory, with which they must seek to engage. This is exemplified in the number of 
standards with which they must comply. This increase in pressure and feeling of being 
overwhelmed can lead to important information being missed or incorrectly prioritised, 
reducing situation awareness. The scale of information available may not only undermine an 
individual’s capacity to process but also induce complacency, leading to valuable sources 
being ignored.  
Respondents measured the trustworthiness of the information available on the basis of 
somewhat subjective criteria such as character judgement when receiving verbal accounts 
from employees, appraisal of the track record of companies with whom they were dealing, 
the interviewee’s personal interpretation of the data, value judgements as to the reputation 
of external agencies such as environmental bodies, and whether or not the interviewee 
regarded the information as ‘just a fact’. Interviewees also reported issues with inaccurate 
manufacturer’s data and paperwork, fragmentary information from third parties and poor 
quality information provided by suppliers. In terms of determining whether information was 
trustworthy, interviewees confirmed the preference for internal sources.  
Frequently the validity of information used in decision making was only tested after its use 
and indeed after the incident was over. Respondents tended to focus on the immediate 
information required to take the next steps rather than the information which would enable 
them to form a longer term view. 
There were perceived information barriers regarding the nature of information, including 
the effective translation of information for foreign workers, the development of media to 
make instruction more visually explicit, the introduction of explicit procedures for how to 
access, process and apply information in work roles and a need to trend health and safety 
issues more effectively. It was also felt that disparate systems and a lack of resources to deal 
with health and safety information helped to create information barriers. 
Where gaps in information existed they often related to: information not being available on 
what corrective actions were expected of an organisation in the early stages of an incident; 
logistical information; and information on how the incident would affect key equipment. It 
was also suggested that where information is changed in daily operations these are not 
always propagated to associated references, exacerbating the potential for error during an 
incident. For some incidents there was felt to be a need for all information that might be 
required to be available in a single widely accessible digital form. 
In some cases during a critical incident interviewees reported they had no access to 
information which would have aided them to assess the impact of their decisions. For others 
the systems in place did not allow for the creation of reliable statistical models to support 
their decision making. In some cases there were issues with accessibility of required 
information which resulted in delays in first step responses to an incident, and others 
identified a challenge accessing the highly specialist information sought.   
As with most information behaviour, individuals tend to place great trust in informal 
sources, such as peers, and the ubiquitous recourse of surfing the Internet. With 
information being sought and disseminated through numerous channels and by a variety of 
means, a great concern for health and safety managers is that messages are not always 
being received, internalised and operated upon, but rather getting lost in the ‘white noise’. 
This lack of comprehension may have negative consequences on the ability to derive 
meaning and significance from information, therefore reducing situation awareness and 
increasing the risk of incidents occurring.  
 
Conclusions: The Applicability of Information Models to the Research Findings 
In data collected from a real world complex business environment, the stages identified in 
the information seeking behaviour models can be observed throughout. However, the 
reality of an information seeking episode such as those illustrated in the critical incidents on 
which the current study draws, is that the stages merge and overlap as information of 
multiple types is required at different points in a process which is non-linear and where 
strands overlap and interact. The situation may involve multiple players and systems, and 
can become chaotic as a result of time and other pressures. 
Situation awareness has become an important conceptual part of the process of system 
design for particular operator fields of engagement such as air flight: however, it can be 
readily seen how such an approach would have value for the design of health, safety and 
emergency response information systems. The authors have not found evidence of such use 
to date, but future research might valuably explore the identification of data, with user 
consultation, which would best enhance situation awareness. It would also be valuable to 
explore the role of systems in effective communication during emergency response, and 
how data may be best aggregated for team access to support situation awareness 
throughout the critical incident.  
Kuhlthau (1991) presents broad categories of stages in information seeking behaviour all of 
which are relevant to the current study, but more significantly for the current research her 
observations on the influence of feelings and emotions on information behaviour are 
confirmed in the present study. Respondents reported feelings of frustration and being 
overwhelmed as a result of the information gaps and barriers they encountered, while 
feeling under intense pressure as a result of the time constraints in which they operated. 
Respondents noted uncertainty, anxiety and confusion in describing their experience of 
critical incidents. They relied on ‘gut instinct’, experience and familiar and trusted resources 
very readily in circumstances where the use of invalid information might impact on the 
outcomes of a catastrophic event.  Perhaps the focus on critical incidents heightens the 
significance of the affective: however the present authors would argue that the affective 
domain is always relevant to a degree. 
Ellis and Haugan (1997) give no sequence to the stages of their information model, and 
focus on the variety of actions which comprise information seeking behaviour. The present 
study highlights this complex process of information seeking and use in a real life situation, 
and indicates that information seeking does not happen in a systematic manner, especially 
when dealing with an emergency situation.  Information may be subject to other 
constraints, such as physical location and time, which impact fundamentally on an abstract 
conceptualisation of the information search process. 
Leckie, Pettigrew and Sylvain (1996) provide a model in a work related context, and 
highlight the differences between individual organisations and the effect this can have on 
information behaviour. The data presented here confirms this finding as the systems and 
procedures organisations have in place can influence the information seeking of their 
employees. Another dimension of the organisational context is the company’s culture and 
bigger picture agenda, where, while the rhetoric may be about openness and sharing, in 
actuality there is active constraint on information sharing, and this constraint is likely to be 
more rigorously enforced in a critical situation. 
Wilson (1996) also considers the ‘person in context’ and the intervening variables which can 
influence information behaviour. This is manifested in the time constraints placed on an 
information need, especially when dealing with an emergency situation, but also by the 
external pressures from other organisations and channels of communication between 
concerned parties. This notion of the individual actor as part of a complex team of players 
comes across very strongly in the current research. Also significant from the Wilson model 
(1996) in the context of the current research is the distinction between the passive and 
active searcher. In the current research much of the organisational strategy in design of 
safety systems is fuelled by a view of a company seeking to engage with a passive recipient 
of information, rather than seeing the user as an active information searcher. This is a 
fundamental flaw in existing system design evidenced by the present study. 
What is also evidenced by the present research is that the real world information seeking 
environment is a complex, fluid and rapidly changing environment and to seek to distil this 
world into a one dimensional model may be unhelpful. Whilst people like Leckie, Pettigrew 
and Sylvain (1996) and Wilson (1996) have sought to convey complexity, it remains a 
challenge to fully represent the real world environment in a model which allows for 
comparison and contrast, and therefore deeper understanding of information behaviour. 
There are hypothetically limitless variables which can and do influence information 
behaviour which must be understood, and both these models go some of the way towards 
achieving this.  It may be interesting for future research to consider alternative scientific 
approaches to modelling which are capable of illustrating complexity in a dynamic way. A 
major benefit of creating a model is that in its generation, the researcher must provide 
routes through complexity and codify our sense of the limitless in a meaningful way. 
Another level of complexity that is demonstrated in the present research is that of the actor 
dealing with multiple simultaneous information needs; an emergency response team may 
have several issues with which to deal, all of which require different types of information 
from different sources, with varying impacts on the incident outcome. Calls for integrated 
systems and clearly presented information reflect how complex a task this can be.  In a 
world of uncertainty, as is characteristic of a critical incident, users look for certainty and 
clarity – indeed that is arguably one of the chief motivators in any information seeking 
situation. One of the most interesting findings of the current research is the lack of 
verification, analysis or filtering that takes place and the degree of subjectivity that was 
observed amongst respondents. Information behaviour models are, to an extent, rooted in a 
rationalist view of the world, while the study provides evidence that intuition rather than 
analysis may be a relatively common mode of dealing with complexity. 
Information behaviour models are highly useful devices to assist researchers in 
conceptualising our understanding of information behaviour. The present authors believe 
that an understanding of these models helps in the design of effective research whether for 
a real life practical purpose or in more abstract conceptualisation. While the industries 
commissioning research may desire a more pragmatic outcome, without a deep 
understanding of the theoretical base upon which they can draw, those carrying out the 
research will merely skim the surface in their research and are highly unlikely to add to 
knowledge in any significant way. The latter is surely the aim of all serious researchers. The 
experience of undertaking the research described in this paper has indicated that it is 
possible to design research which not only satisfies industry needs in a way that can be 
understood and applied, but also to draw deeper learning from the findings. 
While industry-led research may be focused on the headlines and broad lessons to be 
drawn, inevitably the academic researcher is more interested in what may seem the small 
detail. The authors believe that the most significant findings in their research relate to the 
information challenges, barriers and gaps and their impact on effective and open 
information sharing within companies and across the industry and on the capacity of that 
industry to operate safely and deal with emergencies. The industry audience however was 
interested in the next big idea: sometimes it is the nexus between these two expectations 
where the next big idea actually evolves. 
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Appendix 1 – Survey Monkey Questionnaire; Health and safety Information 
General Information: In this section please provide general information about you and 
your organisation. 
1. What is your job title? 
2. In which of the following functions does your role sit? 
a. Senior management 
b. Engineering 
c. Supply chain 
d. Production 
e. Human resources 
f. Health and safety 
g. Operations 
h. Finance 
i. IT 
j. Other (if other please specify) 
3. What type of company do you work for? 
a. Operator 
b. Service company 
c. Contractors 
d. Suppliers 
e. Other (if other please specify) 
4. Where are you primarily based: 
a. Office 
b. Field 
c. Other (if other please specify) 
5. Please indicate in which of these global regions your organisation operates? (please 
tick all that apply) 
a. Africa 
b. Arctic 
c. Asia 
d. Europe 
e. Non EU European (e.g. Russia) 
f. North America 
g. Oceania 
h. South America 
i. UKCS 
j. Other (if other please specify) 
6. Please indicate in which of these global regions you would normally work? (please 
tick all that apply) 
a. Africa 
b. Arctic 
c. Asia 
d. Europe 
e. Non EU European (e.g. Russia) 
f. North America 
g. Oceania 
h. South America 
i. UKCS 
j. Other (if other please specify) 
 
Health and safety: This section explores various aspects of your organisation’s health and 
safety. 
7. How important do you believe health and safety is: 
a. To your organisation: 
i. Very important 
ii. Important 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unimportant 
v. Very unimportant 
b. In your part of the organisation: 
i. Very important 
ii. Important 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unimportant 
v. Very unimportant 
8. Does your organisation have any information systems in place to support health and 
safety? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
9. Does your organisation operate a consistent and uniform health and safety 
management system across all operations? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
10. Is your organisation's health and safety system part of a company wide integrated 
computer system (Enterprise Resource Planning)? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
11. Please indicate the approach that exists across the health and safety system used in 
your organisation: 
a. Each site operates a separate system 
b. A mixture of corporate and local systems 
c. A single corporate system is used 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other (if other please specify) 
12. How committed are you personally to safety in your role at your organisation? 
a. Very committed 
b. Committed 
c. Neither 
d. Uncommitted 
e. Very uncommitted 
13. To what degree do you influence decisions and direction on safety? 
a. Major influence 
b. Minor influence 
c. No influence 
14. In the last 2 years do you believe the importance of health and safety in your 
organisation has: 
a. Increased 
b. Decreased 
c. Stayed the same 
d. Don’t know 
15. If you believe the importance of health and safety in your organisation has increased 
in the last 2 years, what do you see as being the single main factor? 
a. Changes in regulations 
b. Changes in corporate culture 
c. Changes in management 
d. Organisational changes 
e. In reaction to an incident 
f. Improving a poor safety record 
g. Other (if other please specify) 
16. If you believe the importance of health and safety in your organisation has 
decreased, or stayed the same, what do you see as being the single main factor? 
a. No changes in regulation 
b. Lack of change in corporate culture 
c. Lack of change in management 
d. Lack of organisational changes 
e. Other (if other please specify) 
17. In the last 2 years do you believe the safety performance of your organisation has: 
a. Improved significantly 
b. Improved slightly 
c. Stayed the same 
d. Decreased slightly 
e. Decreased significantly 
18. If you believe your organisation's safety performance has improved, what tools are 
you aware have been used? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Adopted new standards 
b. Increased safety training 
c. Improve sharing of information with contractors 
d. Development of competency based assessments 
e. Enhanced technical training 
f. Focusing on safety behaviours 
g. Increased safety communications internally 
h. Increased senior management championing of safety issues 
i. Updated operational equipment 
j. New company procedures (e.g. safety paperwork) 
k. Not aware of tools being used 
l. Other (if other please specify) 
19. If you believe your organisation's safety performance has stayed the same or not 
improved, what do you think are the reasons for this? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Lack of management direction 
b. No need for increase, we are good enough 
c. Industry standards do not support current industry needs 
d. No money for increased focus 
e. Not enough time 
f. Unable to make any new progress due to lack of systems/processes 
g. Don’t know 
h. Other (if other please specify) 
20. Which of these tools are you aware of your organisation using to measure safety? 
(please tick all that apply) 
a. Number of fatalities 
b. Number of recordable injuries 
c. Lost work time injuries 
d. Number of incidents 
e. Number of high potential incidents 
f. Employee assessments 
g. Behavioural/company culture 
h. Employee retention 
i. Level of employee competence 
j. Employee feedback 
k. Review of team performance 
l. Audits 
m. Competency assessments 
n. Safety not measured 
o. Don’t know 
p. Other (if other please specify) 
21. What are your organisation's current safety priorities? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Changing employee safety behaviours 
b. Changing safety culture of organisation 
c. Meeting regulatory compliance 
d. Addressing new/changed regulations 
e. Improving information systems 
f. Improving the quality of information 
g. Improving access to information 
h. Improving employees awareness of information available 
i. Recording and auditing improvements 
j. Demonstrating employee competency 
k. Don’t know 
l. Other (if other please specify) 
22. In what areas of safety would you most like to see improvements in your 
organisation? (500 characters max) 
23. What types of information would you require to demonstrate to stakeholders where 
your organisation's safety performance is now? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Number of fatalities 
b. Number of recordable injuries 
c. Lost work time injuries 
d. Number of incidents 
e. Employee assessments 
f. Level of employee competence 
g. Employee feedback 
h. Review of team performance 
i. Audits 
j. Competency assessments 
k. Don’t know 
l. Other (if other please specify) 
24. What types of information do you require to assess how safety performance can be 
improved in the future? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Number of fatalities 
b. Number of recordable injuries 
c. Lost work time injuries 
d. Number of incidents 
e. Employee assessments 
f. Level of employee competence 
g. Employee feedback 
h. Review of team performance 
i. Audits 
j. Competency assessments 
k. Don’t know 
l. Other (if other please specify) 
25. How motivated is your organisation to improve safety to: 
a. Meet regulatory requirements: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
b. Minimising non-compliance penalties: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
c. Protect corporate reputation: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
d. Meet clients requirements: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
e. Ensure all staff are competent in their roles: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
f. Ensure all employees are safe at work: 
i. Very motivated 
ii. Motivated 
iii. Neither 
iv. Unmotivated 
v. Very unmotivated 
g. Other (please specify area and level of motivation) 
26. What tools does your organisation use to measure improvements in safety? (500 
characters max) 
27. What challenges does your organisation face in improving safety? (please tick all that 
apply) 
a. Lack of resources 
b. Lack of time to train staff 
c. Inadequate training 
d. Aligning to international standards 
e. Developing a culture of personal responsibility 
f. Lack of communication internally 
g. Lack of communication/information sharing across the supply chain 
h. Lack of personnel competency 
i. Tendency to focus on productivity over safety 
j. Support from senior management 
k. Variations in standards/procedures internally 
l. Limited sharing of best practice across the industry 
m. Human behaviours 
n. Missing or poor quality of information (e.g. process safety, operations 
procedures) 
o. Budget constraints 
p. Constant shift in standards 
q. Permit to work 
r. Shift handover 
s. Operating procedures 
t. Management of change 
u. Operational readiness as a result of commissioning activities 
v. Inspection and maintenance 
w. Don’t know 
x. Other (if other please specify) 
28. 28. What types of information would be required to enable a better understanding 
of these challenges? (500 characters max) 
29. What tools does your organisation use to address any of the challenges identified 
above? (please tick all that apply) 
a. Training 
b. Testing competencies 
c. Improved information systems 
d. Reward and recognition 
e. Improved leadership 
f. Carrying out audits 
g. Improved safety communication 
h. Increased consultation with the wider industry/key stakeholder 
i. Adopting new/improved standards 
j. Increased management support 
k. Don’t know 
l. Other (if other please specify) 
Information: This section investigates the use and flow of information systems within your 
organisation and with external bodies. 
30. Do you have responsibility for information systems in your organisation? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
31. Can information on health and safety be accessed by staff, contractors/suppliers or 
both to: 
a. Assess safety of the environment/job 
b. Respond to an emergency 
c. Improve safety environment/performance 
d. To carry out a task safely (e.g. working at heights) 
32. How suitable are the systems used to report on health and safety across your 
organisation for the following: 
a. To assess safety of job/environment:  
i. Very suitable 
ii. Suitable 
iii. Neither 
iv. Not suitable 
v. Very unsuitable 
vi. Don’t know 
b. To respond to an emergency 
i. Very suitable 
ii. Suitable 
iii. Neither 
iv. Not suitable 
v. Very unsuitable 
vi. Don’t know 
c. To improve safety environment/performance 
i. Very suitable 
ii. Suitable 
iii. Neither 
iv. Not suitable 
v. Very unsuitable 
vi. Don’t know 
33. Have you received any type of training on how to access the information you require 
to operate safely in your role? 
a. Yes 
i. If yes, what type and how often? 
b. No 
34. How does your organisation communicate with you regarding access to the 
systems/information you require in order to carry out your role safely? 
a. Company intranet 
b. E-mail 
c. Newsletter 
d. Safety meetings 
e. They don’t communicate information 
f. Don’t know 
g. Other (if other please specify) 
35. How do you access information so that you can operate safely in your role? 
a. Specialist IT based information systems 
b. Company intranet 
c. Informally through colleagues 
d. Team meetings 
e. Industry expert sites (e.g. OGP) 
f. Other (of other please specify) 
36. What types of information do you access in order to: 
a. Assess safety 
i. Reports 
ii. Incident statistics 
iii. Standards or regulations 
iv. Technical specifications 
v. Contractor information 
vi. Do not access information 
vii. Other (if other please specify) 
b. Respond to an emergency 
i. Reports 
ii. Incident statistics 
iii. Standards or regulations 
iv. Technical specifications 
v. Contractor information 
vi. Do not access information 
vii. Other (if other please specify) 
c. Improve safety 
i. Reports 
ii. Incident statistics 
iii. Standards or regulations 
iv. Technical specifications 
v. Contractor information 
vi. Do not access information 
vii. Other (if other please specify) 
37. How confident are you that the information you access is up to date and suitable for 
its purpose? 
a. Very confident 
b. Confident 
c. Neither 
d. Not confident 
e. Seriously concerned 
38. How easy is it for you to find the information that you require to perform safely in 
your role? 
a. Very easy 
b. Easy 
c. Variable 
d. Difficult 
e. Very difficult 
39. Have you ever been unable to access information related to performing your role 
safely which you know is available in your organisation? 
a. Yes 
i. If yes, please specify why you could not access the information 
b. No 
40. Where information is available, have you ever not understood how to search for the 
relevant information? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
41. When accessing safety information you require, is it clear what the purpose of this 
information is (what it can be used for)? 
a. Yes, it is clear 
b. No, it is not clear 
c. Not always clear 
42. Are you provided with clear instruction on how to present/record information 
related to safety in your role? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not always 
43. Do you feel that your corporate information standards are visible to those that need 
to adhere to them? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
44. Have there been any incidences where you/your colleagues have not recorded 
information related to safety (e.g. near misses)? 
a. Yes 
i. If yes, please specify information and reasons why 
b. No 
45. Do you/your colleagues share safety related information with 
operators/contractors/suppliers you work with? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not always 
d. N/A 
46. Do operators/contractors/suppliers share safety related information with you/your 
colleagues? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not always 
d. N/A 
47. What are the roadblocks to sharing information between operators/contractors or 
between disciplines? (500 characters max) 
48. How important is it for safety purposes for you other 
operators/contractors/suppliers to be able to share information with each other? 
a. Very important 
b. Important 
c. Neither 
d. Unimportant 
e. Very unimportant 
49. When sharing information between operators/contractors are you aware of gaps in 
the information? 
a. Yes 
i. If you have answered yes, please specify the information gaps 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
50. Does your current information system allow the sharing of lessons learned from 
incidences/near misses across the organisation? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
i. If you have answered no, please specify what the barriers are to 
sharing this type of information 
c. Don’t know 
51. What other types of information, not already made available, do you require to 
improve your safety performance within the organisation? (500 characters max) 
52. How could the current information available and its delivery be improved upon? 
(500 characters max) 
53. Any other comments? (500 characters max) 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Interview Guide; Health and safety Information 
The aim of this study is to ascertain your interaction with information related to health and 
safety aspects of your operation, both on an ongoing basis, and in relation to a critical 
incident which has been previously agreed by your organisation to be used as a focus for 
this interview. 
The interview is expected to take approximately 1 hour; this varies on how much each 
participant has to say on the subject.  For purposes of transcription and analysis of the key 
themes, we would like the opportunity to record this interview.  All of your responses will 
be kept strictly confidential, and in any publications arising from the research yours and 
your company’s anonymity are guaranteed.  Are you happy for me to go ahead and record 
this interview?   
 
Organisation Overview 
Could you please tell me a little bit about your organisation and your position?  
• What global regions do you operate in?   
• How many staff do you employ?  
• Length of service in company/oil industry? 
 
How important is safety as part of your company’s strategy? 
• Has its importance become greater or less in recent years?  
• What has influenced that change for the company? 
• What types of challenges exist in improving safety in your organisation? 
• What types of tools are used/could be used to address these challenges? 
 
Critical Incident – Has been agreed in advance, refer to it here 
Stage 1 – incident awareness 
I would like you to talk me through the incident from your first awareness that there was a 
problem through to your disengagement from the incident:   
• What was your role within the incident? 
• Was the incident totally unexpected? 
• Should your organisation’s information system have given you the ability to identify 
this incident before it occurred? Were there early warnings that something was 
going wrong? Was there information available which was ignored that may have 
prevented the incident if action had been taken? 
• If your system couldn’t have made you aware, then what is it that the system 
couldn’t tell you that you needed to know? 
• Generally speaking do your information systems allow you to identify potential 
problems? What aspect of the system allows this? 
• Had there been any breakdown in communication prior to the incident which meant 
that those who might have taken action were unaware there was an issue?  Please 
describe?  What specific aspects of the systems highlighted the incident for 
you/should have identified the incident for you? 
• How did you seek to find out more about what was actually happening? Which 
systems and/or people did you approach, both internally and externally? How did 
you know where to go to find out more? What happened during the first reactive 
stage? 
 
Stage 2 – taking action 
• Was it easy to communicate with the systems or people necessary at this stage? 
What problems did you encounter at this stage? 
• How quickly did you have to start making decisions about how to deal with the 
incident? 
• Were you part of a team or working alone? 
• If a team response was necessary how did you liaise with others on the team and 
agree how to proceed? 
• What did you need/most want to know as you proceeded in order to take action or 
make decisions in handling this incident? 
• How did you test the robustness of decisions being made at that stage? Did you have 
access to data about what the impact of decisions was likely to be?  
• Did you also have to consult external sources for advice/help? Who what were they? 
How did you identify external sources of helpful data? 
• What kind of data would have been useful that you didn’t have? 
• Did the systems your organisation has in place give you the ability to create reliable 
statistical models to support your decision making in this incident?  How do you feel 
this impacted on you/the incident as a whole? 
• Did these systems change as a result of the incident?  What can it do better now, if it 
has been changed? 
• Can you give an example of a decision in this situation that might have been 
improved if you had had better access to information? 
• Did you share/receive information from contractors/suppliers related to this 
incident?  Why/not?  How did the information impact on/help the situation? 
• How accessible did you find the specific information you required, was it easy to 
find, were there any delays in getting this information and if so how did this impact 
the overall outcome of the incident? 
• Did you feel that you had sufficient time to access/review/understand and apply the 
information during the incident?   
• Could the information you reviewed in relation to this incident have been presented 
in a different/better way/format that could have impacted differently on the 
incident – how? 
• Can you give me an example of formats/types of information that you felt were 
particularly helpful/relevant in helping you to deal with the incident?  Which was the 
most valuable, and why in particular were these so beneficial?   
• Was there any information you received that was not particularly helpful/relevant? 
What was the least valuable information you received and why? 
• Did you trust the sources of information?   
• Can you give any examples of a trusted source, and outline why you trusted this? 
• Can you give me any examples of information that you regarded as less reliable, and 
why it was less so?   
• What actions were taken/outcomes if you did not trust the information? 
• How did you decide which information was trustworthy?  (e.g. was it because you 
had used it before/validated it etc?) 
• Were you required to validate the information? 
• Was there a status attached to the information which verified it was fit for the 
purpose of safety analysis? 
• When dealing with this incident, in what ways could your management systems have 
made it easier/more efficient for you to access the different types of information you 
require to proceed? 
• Did you find any gaps in the information that you required to deal with this incident?  
If so what where they? 
• Where you found gaps in the information, how critical a role do you feel that the 
lack/incorrectness/incompleteness of this information played in this critical incident? 
• Was there any point at which you felt at a complete loss, or you didn’t know what 
was going on?  If so please describe and what did you do? 
• Did you feel well supported throughout? What would have helped? 
• How important was it to communicate to others what was happening as you sought 
to deal with the incident? Who needed to know what? How did you decide what 
information to release?  
• Was the company’s communication department involved in this? Did they actively 
seek information from you about what was happening and what could be released? 
• Were you subject to an OSHA/HSE audit as a result of this incident, if so were you 
able to quickly and efficiently provide them with the information they requested? If 
not, what problems did you encounter and why?  What about if you were subject to 
a general ad hoc visit on a general basis? 
• Did your organisation use this incident as a means of identifying lessons learned 
regarding information access? If so, in what way?   
• Were any changes made to how information was gathered/stored/presented?  
• Were any changes made to processes in response to critical incidents? 
 
Safety Information 
• Are you comfortable that you can assess if your key safety processes and procedures 
comply with current regulatory requirements and standards? Please specify. 
• Thinking of safety information are you challenged by changing regulations and 
standards? Please specify. 
 
• Does your organisation provide suitable guidance/training for all employees on how 
to access information so that they understand how/where to search for the 
information? 
• How does our organisation communicate with you/other employees on where to 
find systems/information related to safety? 
• Does your organisation use any tool/applications to assess Safety Culture?  If yes, 
please specify. 
• If you do use a tool/application to measure Safety Culture, does it include an 
assessment of Process Safety Information? 
• Would you say that your emergency response plan is supported by easily accessible 
and up-to-date information to support the plan (e.g. P&IDS, Start-up and shutdown 
procedures, etc.)? If not, what is your key challenge in this regard?   
• Do you have the Process Safety Information to support both Leading and Lagging 
Safety Indicators? If either presents a challenge, briefly state which and why.  Where 
you have this information do you feel it is up to date?  If not then can you give an 
indication of how much is outdated – e.g. percentage wise? 
• In terms of health and safety information as a whole, what general kinds of 
information/systems do you use/access, to carry out your role safely?   
 
• Do you feel that you have access to all of the information you require for your daily 
decision making and to collaborate with colleagues?  If not what is missing?   What is 
the impact of any missing information, how can the organisations overcome this?  
 
• How integrated do you feel that the different systems/types of information you use 
are, particularly in the area of process safety management/safety procedures?   
 
• Do the systems you use allow you to check what standards you need to comply with 
in different safety situations, both domestically and internationally?  Where do you 
go to find out about the different standards that you need to comply with? 
 
• How suitable are the systems you use for health and safety information in allowing 
you/contractors/suppliers to: 
o Assess safety of the environment/job 
o Respond to an emergency 
o Improve safety environment/job 
 
• Do you deal with accessing Management of Change (MOC) and PHA (Process Hazard 
Assessment) information associated with any equipment or system (i.e. asset)?  If so 
is previous information on these readily accessible to you?  If not what can’t you 
access and why? 
o How many MOCs are issued monthly and what is their typical backlog?   
o How many of these are incorrectly classified? 
• How many work permits are issued monthly and how many of these are not 
completed properly or correctly? 
• Can you easily access the information you require to raise a Hot Working permit? 
• Have you ever found it challenging to gather information for an incident 
Investigation, or an internal/external audit? If so please state why, and what the 
main challenges are. 
• Are all types of incidents recorded in your organisation?  Are there specific types of 
incidents that would generally be recorded in the industry but are not within your 
reporting systems? 
• What are the most common non-conformances you find as a result of safety audits? 
• Has your organisation ever been cited for any OSHA/HSE or EPA (Environmental 
Protection Agency) related non-conformances, if so can you share the nature of this 
with me? 
• How confident are you that the safety information you access in relation to your role 
is up to date and relevant for its purpose?  Do you trust this information in your 
decision making? 
• Are you able to validate the quality of information at any point in time and identify 
what/if anything is missing or inconsistent?  Any specific examples? 
• Have you experienced any safety related shutdowns that could be attributed to 
information availability or quality?  If so can you please discuss? 
• When comparing information across different systems are there any gaps that you 
have identified that should not be there?  What are these gaps in the information?  
How could they impact on the organisations?  How/do you overcome these gaps? 
• Where there is a change to information can you be sure that this is propagated to all 
associated references? 
• Are you involved in the sharing of shift handover logs and lessons learned from shift 
to shift, across the entire operating environment?  Examples? 
• Do you have any specific examples where information failures have caused an 
incident in relation to permit to work/during shift change/in operational 
readiness/during plant upsets or abnormal operation/ during management of 
change? 
• Do you feel there are any issues with the amount of information that you are 
required to deal with in relation to health and safety in the organisation (e.g. 
information overload).  If yes (and it’s negative) then what would you say is the 
impact of the amount of information on those that are using it, and how the use the 
information (i.e. does information get ignored or missed).  Do you have any specific 
examples to highlight this? 
• With the ageing demographics of the oil and gas workers is knowledge retention an 
issue for your organisation, how do you go about capturing the knowledge that 
these workers have before they leave to retire, do you have specific systems in place 
to do this.  What does this whole issue mean for your organisation, what problems 
do you encounter as a result of this? 
• In what ways could a management system make it easier for you to access health 
and safety related information? 
• What do you feel are the major information barriers for your company to make 
improvements in safety, and how could this be improved on? 
• What do you think the impact of that improvement would give the company and 
your role? 
• Have you been aware of any incidences of general safety data not being logged, 
attempts to cover up due to issues of trust/blame culture? 
• How critical a role do you feel information plays in safety decisions? 
• Are the information systems utilised in your organisation helping to drive safety? 
• Do you feel that there is merit in being able to access safety related information 
from other disciplines/contractors you work with? 
• Does your safety information system allow you to share lessons learnt across your 
enterprise? If this is a challenge, please specify.  Please give specific examples. 
• What, if any, cost would you say your organisation incurs on a yearly/monthly basis 
as a result of incidents and fines for non-compliance? 
• Are your information systems capable of being used internationally across different 
cultures? If not what are the major problems? 
• Which KPIs do you have in place to measure the performance of your HSE? 
• How long does it typically take you to get the necessary data to compute these? 
• General and Future Development Information Management  
• Do you know if your organisation participates in the Global Reporting Initiative? If so 
do you know what the main challenges are in providing the necessary information to 
complete the report?  
• At present what level do you think your company’s safety information systems are 
now? Deficient, capable of improvement, adequate, outstanding? 
• How do you think your company could improve these systems in the future? 
• What does an ideal information management system look like to you? 
• What would you say are the three key benefits of a focused/efficient information 
management system to a company/contractor operating in the oil and gas industry? 
• What one main benefit do you feel your organisation could leverage from a better 
information system? 
• What else might be done overall to improve safety information systems in the oil 
and gas industry?  
• Do you have any other comments you would like to make with the use of 
information/systems in your organisation in relation to health and safety? 
• Thank you very much for your participation in this research.  If we need to clarify 
anything from the interview can we get back to you?   
 
